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ABSTRACT
Technology Assessment, as a forecasting game of the secondary
and tertiary consequence of the introduction of new technologies,
has enjoyed considerable popularity in the last decade, perhaps
because it is a convenient tool to qualify bad conscience toward
technological innovation.
In long-range forecasting, however, technology assessment has
strong limits. They are described here by the example of the
spinning wheel, a supremely modest implement which has had a major
influence upon the history of Western countries.
These limits may be intrinsic. Some hints are given for a
strategy to define them.
-iii-

A POST MORTEM TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF THE SPINNING WHEEL:
THE LAST THOUSAND YEARS*
I have been asked to say a few words before this conference"
parts about our thinking, if you like, on technology assessment,
in relation to the work of IIASA's Energy Systems Program. With
a time horizon of about fifty or perhaps a hundred years, techno-
logy assessment is an essential part of it. However, since we
do not produce methodologies of technology assessment, what I am
going to convey to you most probably is the grumbling of the con-
sumer.
First let me redefine technology assessment, because what I
have seen in the papers presented here somehow escaped the strict
definition of technology assessment, which is the analysis of
secondary and tertiary effects upon the socioeconomic system of
the introduction of a new technology. Consequently, if one studies
for instance the effect upon the drivability of a car of putting
the engine in front or in the back, this is not technology
assessment but system analysis. In this sense most of the work
of the Energy Group is systems analysis even if the subject is
for instance the effect of using large amounts of coal on trans-
portation, on the conservation of resources, on pollution, in-
cluding pollution at the level of the entire atmosphere, etc.
I would say that technology assessment at a certain moment re-
quires qualitative discontinuity. For example, when we look at
the introduction of nuclear energy into the socioeconomic system,
trying to understand the change in the organization of the socio-
economic system that results from the introduction of nuclear
energy, we are engaged in technology assessment.
Yet in doing that we are at a loss because out of the
thousands, or perhaps hundreds, of scenarios--as we call our con-
figurations--thereis at best one that will be realized, and we
lack any real criteria to detect it.
Having tried to find the knots of the problem, I would say
that, in a nutshell, the difficulty in doing technology assess-
ment stems from the imponderable and historical opportunity.
Let me show this by using an example from a speech of Lynn White,
a medieval historian. It spans a thousand years, a period that
lends the necessary historical depth many technology assessments
lack, I am afraid, and that brings out the problem of historical
opportunity and the consequences of the imponderable on the
evolution of a system.
*Contribution to the Workshop on Systems Assessment of
New Technologies: International Perspectives, Laxenburg,
18-21 July, 1977.
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For some ten thousand years, or five, or something of that
order, man has dressed in clothes. Clothes are made from fiber,
and the fiber was then painstakingly twisted into thread by hand,
the thread woven into cloth, and the cloth shaped into a dress.
If you "linearize" your clothes, you would be astonished how
much thread there is in a suit--it may be a kilometer or two--and
in the original way of making that--by twisting the thread from
a bundle of fibers with the help of a small tool--an innumerable
number of hours went into the making of that thread. This spin-
ning was so important and time-consuming that a moral value had
to be attached to it, and in fact the Roman matron of virtue
stayed at home and spun the wool, as was written on the epi-
taphs: "Domui mansit, lanam fecit". The quintessential break-
through was the invention of the spinning wheel, which happened
in China, around perhaps the year one thousand. The year of
1050 saw the first drawing of this machine, which speeded up by
a factor of 10 or perhaps 100, the rate at which the bundle of
fibers was spun. This led to an obvious breakthrough in the
production of clothes around the year 1200, when the machine
slowly diffused to Europe, where the already existing 100m was
a quite efficient machine with respect to the known spinning
methods. Thus the bottleneck of spinning was removed.
You may ask people in the technology assessment what is
going to happen when a bottleneck is removed and production in-
creased. Many more clothes will be made, and many more rags
will be thrown away, he will aruMe4 and you will have a problem
of disposal and pollution. An American technology assessor,
asked about the consequences would probably reply that you have
to carry out research on how to burn rags, or perhaps, how to
recycle rags which is somehow nasty because the fibers are so
tightly twisted. Burning them you will have ashes and carbon
dioxide, but everything can be cleaned up easily. What actually
happened was quite different. The very large amount of rags was
used by a new industry, again an import from China: the paper
industry. Paper was in very short supply around 1200 because
of the paucity of rags. So there was a bottleneck. On the
other hand, books were in short supply because, in order to make
a good thick bible, for instance, one to two hundred sheep or
calves had to be killed in order to make parchment out of their
hides.
Thus the bottleneck was not writing a book but the cost of
making the material on which to write. And there was no real
incentive for improving the efficiency of the system of writing.
But when the avalanche of rags came in, a relatively cheap paper
was available; then the cost of writing a book became essen-
tially the cost of the amanuenses who had to spend days and
weeks and months to copy the book down. So the bottleneck be-
came these amanuenses, and to remove it one had to run the
amanuenses fast. The best way of doing that is to invent
printing, and so automatically from this historical opportunity,
printing developed--not out of a vacuum but from a call from the
system which I call historical opportunity. So there was
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printing, and paper, and books. Lots of books, and cheap ones.
Cheap books are a quintessential element in the diffusion
of knowledge within a society, and the spread of knowledge
brought about a quite important social revolution. Societies
tend to stratify and to stabilize themselves by stratification
of knowledge. The increasing diffusion of knowledge down to
the lower strata of society has been considered necessary-
-historical opportunity again--for the constitution and evolu-
tion of democracy. So finally, modern democracy is a direct,
if not necessary, consequence of the invention of the spinning
wheel in China about one thousand years ago.
How can you now put that chain of elements and opportunity
into a model that helps you to forecast the future? The task
seems desperate, and we feel that. I have checked which other
branches of science face a similar situation. The nearest
appears to be biology where essentially the same problems
have occurred since Darwin because the focus of evolutionary
theory has been mutation. Mutation can be considered a techno-
logical innovation, whose causes are imponderable, that is
being tested against the historical opportunity of the existing
structure of biological systems and their external boundary con-
ditions, which determine the probability of their success. From
what I have seen of the technical literature in biology, the
situation is as desparate. Biologists think that large and
complex systems can be interpreted on the basis of their compo-
nents, but that they cannot be constructed on that basis. The
reason again is the imponderable, which is a very fascinating ele-
ment in the evolution of systems. But the imponderable cannot
be pondered. So I am grumbling, and I am asking you if you can
solve the problem. My guess is that perhaps we should imitate
what science did at the end of the Middle Ages when it trans-
cended from the wish to interpret everything--from the origin
of the world to the destiny of man--within a single system,
to the much simpler and accessible level of learning how water
flows in a pipe. Great success has come from the specialization,
and so the reduction of objectives to more manageable proportions
can perhaps lead to more usable protocols for us on the consumer
side.
